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Congress and Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters JAMES M. LINDSAY In 1983 William Bundy called for increased study of Congress and foreign policy:
There is a marked deficiency in serious study on how the executive and Congress interact in an era when the range of issues requiring congressional approval has expanded way beyond the classic cases of treaties and foreign trade, when consensus on foreign policy has disappeared perhaps beyond recall, and when the practical need for congressional understanding and acceptance extends to almost every important step, however labeled or described. ' We have made little progress over the past decade in answering his call. To be sure, we have witnessed the publication of a dizzying array of books and articles exploring the legal and normative aspects of Congress's role in foreign policy.2 to generate and pass its own substantive policy proposals. Using legislative success as the benchmark, Congress does not appear to matter much. Despite the many changes in American politics over the past two decades, Congress generates relatively few of its own foreign policy proposals; the initiative on foreign policy continues to reside in the White House. Congress's influence over decisions appears no better. Although congressional foreign policy debates are more fractious than they were twenty-five years ago, the House and Senate remain reluctant to deny a president's foreign policy requests or to pass alternative policies of their own.
If Congress's influence over foreign policy resided solely in its ability to legislate its own policy preferences, then we would have our answer. But focusing on the legislative track record captures only part of the story. Congress influences policy through several indirect means: anticipated reactions, changes in the decisionmaking process in the executive branch, and political grandstanding. Indeed, the same factors that frustrate congressional attempts to lead on foreign affairs encourage legislators to use indirect means to influence policy. Attention to these indirect means suggests, contrary to the argument made by pessimists, that Congress often exercises considerable influence over the substance of U.S. foreign policy.
The significant indirect impact Congress has on foreign policy makes it imperative to take up William Bundy's challenge. We simply do not understand congressional behavior on foreign policy. The study of Congress and foreign policy gains additional importance because Congress's influence is likely to grow in the 1990s. Of course, the Gulf war produced a rally-round-the-president response in Congress, but that rally has crumbled in the face of other events. The end of the cold war is lowering the electoral costs to legislators who oppose the president on foreign policy. The ever-rising federal debt is forcing Congress to make hard choices about U.S. commitments abroad. Finally, with perceptions of a Soviet threat receding, national security policy is losing its privileged place on the policy agenda. As new types of issues move onto the agenda, congressional activism and influence on foreign policy will increase. Still, legislative victories on foreign policy appear to be the exception rather than the rule.9 In some areas Congress appears to do no more than ratify the president's proposals. This is especially so on decisions to use force. As Operation Desert Storm illustrates, Congress exercises its war powers reluctantly. In other areas Congress often fails to overrule the president, even when the circumstances seem favorable. Take the debates over the Panama Canal treaties and the sale of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia. In both instances substantial numbers of legislators opposed the president's preferred policy. The opposition legislators were highly motivated, enjoyed the support of well-heeled interest groups, and had public sentiment on their side. Congress seemed poised to overrule the White House. But in both cases the president prevailed.
The reluctance of Congress to dictate foreign policy to the president extends beyond high politics, an area where presidents historically have exercised the greatest power. Trade policy offers a case in point. For almost one-hundred-andfifty years Congress zealously guarded its constitutional prerogatives on trade. only for a process that will not offend "congressional sensitivities."" The overwhelming margins of approval for trade legislation are often cited as conclusive evidence of the lack of congressional influence.'2 Even when Congress succeeds in legislating foreign policy, the results may be less than meet the eye. In passing legislation Congress typically delegates tremendous power to the executive branch. Such discretion is justified on the grounds that the president needs flexibility when conducting foreign affairs. But discretion gives the president the opportunity to subvert the intent of Congress. To take one of many possible examples, Congress appropriated military aid to El Salvador provided that President Reagan "certify every six months that the Salvadoran government was 'achieving substantial control' of its armed forces . . . that it was 'implementing essential economic and political reforms,'. . . and that it was holding free elections and demonstrating a willingness to negotiate a political settlement."'3 But the constraint may have been more appearance than reality. Given President Reagan's ideological preferences, it is hard to imagine circumstances in which he would have withheld certification. "4 Efforts to explain the lack of legislative success on foreign policy usually cite the inherent advantages of the presidency: "decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch."'5 These inherent advantages are greatest in national security affairs, and especially in crisis situations. As Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) once complained, crises "never reach Congress until they have developed to a point where Congressional discretion is pathetically restricted."''6 Even when legislators decide to confront the president, he can derail any legislation through the threat or use of a veto; Congress has overridden only one foreign policy veto since 1973 has perhaps done even more to enhance the power of the presidency with its willingness to dismiss many congressional challenges to the executive on the grounds that the contested issues are not ripe for judicial decision or raise political and not legal questions. During Operation Desert Shield, for example, the courts refused to enjoin President George Bush from ordering U.S. troops into combat without congressional authorization. 19 The difficulty Congress has in legislating foreign policy cannot be laid entirely at the feet of the other two branches of government. It also owes to factors specific to the House and Senate. Partisan and institutional divisions mean that lacking consensus-and today consensus is often absent on foreign policyCongress will not act. Congressional action is further complicated by the widely held belief that presidential leadership is essential to successful foreign policy. Electoral considerations reinforce the inclination to defer to the president. Members want to avoid stands that might leave them open to blame and thus to punishment at the polls. Because much of the public believes in the need for strong presidential leadership, many members find "blame avoidance" strategies compelling.20
The inherent advantages of the presidency, Supreme Court rulings, and the nature of Congress take us a long way in explaining why Congress seldom defeats the president on foreign policy. They do not, however, tell the entire story. An essential lesson of life on Capital Hill is that members often have sound policy reasons for not wanting to defeat the president. The reasons for this are many. Congressional debate is public, and the rejection of presidential requests may undermine the negotiating posture of the president or jeopardize U.S. relations with other countries. Legislation almost by necessity is rigid, but diplomacy frequently requires flexibility. Congress acts slowly, but issues can change rapidly. In some cases, resorting to legislation may mean taking a sledgehammer to a problem that requires a scalpel. Legislation may even create perverse incentives: the president may drag his feet implementing congressional directives because he believes any policy failure will be blamed on Congress. In short, legislators often do not want to win, because they believe that legislated solutions will prove unwise or unworkable in practice.
For these members, then, the object is not to pass bills but to use the threat of legislation as a lever with which to pressure the president. Take the efforts of Representative Les Aspin (D-WI) to save the MX missile. Like many of his fellow Democrats, Aspin doubted the strategic argument for the MX. If stopping the MX were his sole concern, a vote against the missile would have been in order. But Aspin concluded that killing the MX undermined a higher policy goal, namely, arms control. Keeping the missile alive would place pressure on the administration to negotiate an arms control treaty. Congress's ability to shape them is of real importance."36 As the history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam illustrates, incremental decision making can lead to major policy commitments.
STRUCTURES AND PROCEDURES
A second reason why a focus on the legislative track record underestimates Congress's influence over foreign policy is that it assumes that legislators only try to change policy directly. Yet legislators are far more savvy than this assumption suggests. They know all too well that efforts to change policy face considerable obstacles. That's why they often try to change structures and procedures in the executive branch. As Representative Aspin writes: "often by establishing new procedures, which are, of course, ostensibly neutral, Congress is able to effect substantive changes."37 Political scientists have been slow to recognize how process shapes policy. Recently, however, the "new institutionalism," which seeks to uncover how different institutional forms affect policy outcomes, has begun to explore the topic.38 New institutionalists begin by noting that electoral incentives limit the enthusiasm legislators have for proactive, systematic reviews of agency behavior. Such "police patrol" oversight has limited electoral appeal either because the agency usually complies with the intent of Congress or because the agency does not harm a legislator's supporters. Either way, legislators often cannot gain credit for their legislative work. Moreover, police patrols entail opportunity costs; legislators could be devoting time to more electorally valuable activities. This incentive structure encourages legislators to fashion the decision-making process in the executive branch in ways that will promote executive compliance with legislative intent or, failing that, will make it easier for affected groups to seek remedies from the agency, the courts, or Congress itself.
Although new institutionalists generally assume legislators are single-minded seekers of reelection, the assumption is not critical.39 Members who want to influence policy also have reason to prefer procedural innovations over police More often than is acknowledged, however, members of Congress grandstand to influence policy.70 Because of the power of the presidency, playing to the galleries is an essential tool of policy entrepreneurs. Legislators understand far better than their critics E. E. Schattschneider's point that increasing the scope of the decision-making arena may change the ultimate decision.7" The media, and especially television, give members the means to overcome the obstacles that block attempts to shape policy through substantive legislation. The glare of the public spotlight is often the best weapon legislators have to dislodge a bill from a hostile committee, to force the administration to reverse its course of action, or to build public support for new policy initiatives.
The fact that legislators usually stand to benefit politically from grandstanding does not make it any less useful a tool for influencing policy. The American political system rests on the assumption that self-interest will motivate legislators to address pressing policy issues. As James Madison wrote, the best way to promote the public good is to create a system in which "the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights."72 Grandstanding also is no less useful because it typically invokes simple, if not simplistic, arguments. Not only do presidents themselves indulge in simple and dramatic appeals -recall President Reagan's Star Wars speech -such appeals are essential to winning the support of the average citizen. Roger Hilsman's discussion of defense policy illustrates why legislators must simplify issues if they want to shape opinion: "There is a great advantage in having an investigation of our military policy concentrate on the single question of who has the most airplanes, the Russians or ourselves. This is a question that anyone can understand, and if the answer is that it is the Russians, then the burden of proof lies on the Executive to justify would have required the president to inform Congress whenever an American intelligence agency sought foreign help in conducting covert operations. 87 The Gulf war is likely to prove only a brief detour on the road to increased congressional assertiveness.
A second reason why Congress is likely to become more influential is that global interdependence is blurring the line that once separated domestic policy from foreign policy. Acid rain provides an example of such an "intermestic" issue. 88 The problem affects not only U.S. relations with Canada but also the economic well-being of states in the Midwest. Drugs, energy policy, farm subsidies, global warming, and immigration are other salient issues that lie astride the domestic and international spheres. Intermestic issues encourage congressional influence because they involve decisions traditionally considered part of domestic policy. Members of Congress, who can be counted on to protect their institutional prerogatives and their constituents, will feel comfortable rewriting presidential proposals on intermestic issues, regardless of the foreign policy implications.
The third development pushing Congress toward greater influence is the ever rising gap between American commitments abroad and American resources. No one denies that today the United States operates under a severe budget constraint. With it becoming increasing unlikely that the federal government can solve the commitment-resources gap by running larger budget deficits, Congress will have to chose between guns and butter. As the steady decline in real spending on defense illustrates, guns are likely to lose that showdown.
The last development that offers to enhance Congress's power stems from growing fears that the American economy is falling behind the economies of Germany and Japan. In the words of Representative Aspin, today we are seeing "the emergence of an entirely new concept of national security. It embraces economics and competitive, commercial relations."89 Former U.S. trade negotiator Clyde Prestowitz put the same point more bluntly: "Trade is defense. We must recognize the nature of the game."90 If the argument that economic vitality is national security continues to gain ground, Congress will become more involved in national security policy for the same reasons it is more influential on intermestic issues. If issues are defined in domestic economic terms, Congress becomes less likely to defer to the wishes of the president. In this respect the 1989 debate over the FSX fighter may be a harbinger of things to come.9' Today the United States is crossing a watershed in its history. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline of American hegemony are forcing the first major rethinking in fifty years of the premises of U.S. foreign policy. Congress will play a key role in redefining America's interests and strategies. How well or poorly elected representatives handle the coming challenges will shape the future of both the country and the world. Unfortunately, a fixation with the legislative scorecard has led scholars to underestimate how Congress influences foreign policy; as a result, we are ill prepared to explain and predict congressional behavior. Hopefully, future research will take up William Bundy's challenge to explore the complexities of congressional decision making on foreign policy. The reward is not only a better understanding of how Congress operates, but also a better understanding of how U.S. foreign policy is made.*
